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Abstract
This paper documents the construction of a novel database on coverage of workers
by employment protection legislation (EPL), across over 90 countries around 2010.
Coverage is shown to be an important, yet largely neglected, aspect of employment
protection institution, complementing our knowledge about the protection level
afforded by this institution. Our findings suggest that while coverage of employees
across the world is generally high, coverage of all employed workers exhibits a
substantial variation across countries in different regions and at different stages of
development, reflecting the fact that wage employment still represents only a small
proportion of total employment in developing countries. Our preliminary results
indicate that there may not necessarily be a trade-off between the level of
protection afforded by EPL and the proportion of workers legally covered by these
rules. The results suggest that failure to account for EPL coverage in studies looking
at aggregate effects of EPL level may lead to overestimating the importance of EPL,
with this overestimation being especially large in lower-income countries.
JEL Classification: J5, J8
Keywords: Employment protection legislation, EPL, Coverage, Labor market institutions,
Labor market indicators
1 Introduction
Employment protection legislation (EPL) is a key labor market institution. Over the
past decades, the demand for knowledge and advice on the role and the adequate set
of EPL has grown in the global context of heightened competition, pressure for greater
labor market flexibility, and especially the jobs crisis of 2008–2016. Many countries
adopted reforms of EPL in the hopes of boosting employment creation and reducing
unemployment, especially among most vulnerable groups.
While the role of employment protection legislation has been studied in various con-
texts, EPL remains one of the most controversial labor market institutions, whether its
impact is examined on unemployment, on productivity, or on economic growth (for
most recent overviews, see Betcherman, 2012; 2014). One of the key features that
virtually all studies on the role of EPL performed on the macroeconomic level share is
the assumption that EPL applies to the whole labor market. Some authors do warn
that labor markets in theory differ from other markets because different rules may
govern employment of different workers (Boeri, 2011). Others also highlight that the
existing measures of EPL account only for the legal dimension of this institution, such
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as the level of protection afforded to workers, but do not consider enforcement or
coverage issues which are essential to understanding how labor regulations operate
(Bertola et al., 2000). Yet, these issues remain largely out of the scope of the analysis.
Empirical studies, starting from the pioneering Lazear (1990), to now typically cited
Scarpetta (1996), Nickell (1997), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), 1 but also more re-
cently Bassanini and Duval (2009) or De Serres et al. (2012), contain an implicit as-
sumption that EPL rules apply to all workers. Likewise, some recent theoretical or
general equilibrium studies, such as Bouis et al. (2011) or Cacciatore et al. (2012),
model EPL effect similar to other macroeconomic variables that concern all workers. In
the same spirit, analytical work conducted by international organizations, whether the
World Bank (ex.: World Bank, 2013), the IMF (ex.: IMF, 2016), the OECD (ex.: OECD,
2007 and subsequent publications), or the ILO (ex.: ILO, 2015a), does not generally ac-
count for EPL coverage. Our paper shows that, because EPL rarely concerns all
workers, such studies most probably overestimate the aggregate EPL effect, as well as
the scope and the size of EPL reforms that need to be undertaken.
The aim of this paper is to document the extent to which the issue of EPL coverage
may matter. We start by exploring the information provided by the ILO EPLex2
database, which records legal rules governing termination of employment contracts,3
regulations of fixed-term contracts, as well as the scope of regulation, or legal coverage.
The ILO EPLex database, under its “scope of regulation” section, lists firm and worker
categories that are formally excluded from statutes, in a sample of over 90 countries,
over the period from 2009 to 2013. Equipped with this listing, we use national statistics
of these countries, as well as other data sources, to assemble data on the number of
workers in each of the excluded categories. We relate this to the total number of em-
ployees and of the employed to construct measures of legal coverage of employment
protection legislation for employees and for the employed, respectively. As the ILO
EPLex database contains legal coverage of workers concerned only by legal provisions
and not including, apart from very few exceptions, case law or collective agreements on
this subject, the coverage data that we thus assemble can be viewed as the EPL coverage
by laws, or what can be called a general EPL regime, rather than EPL coverage at large.4
These coverage data also complement the EPLex aggregate indicators (ILO, 2015c)
measuring the overall level of legal protection afforded to workers in case of individual
termination of regular contracts at the initiative of the employer, as well as the ILO
EPLex information on regulations of fixed-term contracts. This paper further docu-
ments all the methodological issues encountered during this data compilation, as well
as all data sources and assumptions made. It also shows differences across countries in
the extent of EPL legal coverage, highlighting the importance of accounting for it in the
macroeconomic analysis of EPL.
Our results demonstrate that EPL coverage varies significantly across countries. In
some countries, legal coverage of employees by the general EPL regime is complete
(i.e., Armenia or Romania), while in others, it is relatively low (i.e., Turkey, which
excludes domestic workers, agricultural workers, managers/executives, some other
worker categories, but also enterprises with less than 30 workers). Naturally, because
by definition EPL only applies to workers who are in a subordinate employment rela-
tionship (wage employees), and does not apply to self-employed, by construction, EPL
coverage for employees is always higher than EPL coverage of the employed. In
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developed countries, where wage employment represents a large share of total employ-
ment, EPL coverage of the employed is close to that of employees, and both tend to be
very high, ranging from 90 to 100 %. In developing countries, however, where wage em-
ployment remains limited, EPL concerns only a very small portion of all employed, be-
ing less than 5 % in a country like Niger. Clearly, studies and policy actions addressing
the role of EPL in such settings should focus not only on setting up an appropriate
level of EPL but also on ensuring that EPL is a relevant institution.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the
particularities of coverage information. Section 3 outlines methodological assump-
tions of the data construction. Section 4 provides detailed data description.
Section 5 discusses the relationship between coverage and level of protection
afforded by EPL. The remainder of the paper contains data collection assump-
tions (Appendices 1 and 2). All data sources are made available through an on-
line appendix and are also available on request.
2 Defining coverage: from legal to statistical definitions
Legal EPL coverage can be defined as categories of workers and firms that are con-
cerned by EPL provisions. Usually, legal statutes describing EPL rules stipulate its
scope; in other words, they list groups of workers and enterprises that are (not) con-
cerned by these provisions. We start by exploring the information provided by the ILO
EPLex database, which records both legal rules governing termination of employment
contracts and the scope of regulation, or legal coverage. Based on this information,
Table 1 shows various categories of workers that may be excluded from EPL provisions.
Only very few countries do not have any exclusions, suggesting that the coverage of
employees is complete (Afghanistan, Armenia, Georgia, Malaysia, Republic of Moldova,
Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia); however, in the vast majority of countries, at least
some exclusions are present. Table 2 further shows various categories of firms that also
may be excluded from EPL provisions. Usually, such exclusions are linked to the firm
size. Only five countries of the sample fully exclude certain firms from legal coverage of
employment protection legislation in case of individual dismissals, though a few others
may also contain exclusions for cases of collective dismissals.
In its turn, statistical definition of legal EPL coverage can be formulated as a propor-
tion of workers that are concerned by EPL provisions, either because they are directly
covered or because they work in firms that are covered by legal EPL provisions.
In order to build statistical indicators of coverage, we collect data from various
sources on (1) the number of individuals in each category of workers excluded from
EPL provisions (based on Table 1); (2) the number of wage employees employed by
firms that are excluded from legal provisions (based on Table 2); (3) total number of
employees in an economy; and (4) total number of employed.
Using this information, two types of coverage are defined and computed as follows:
Coverage of employees ¼ Employees – excluded employeesð Þ= Employees ð1Þ
Coverage of employed ¼ Employees – excluded employeesð Þ= Employed ð2Þ
By definition, employees constitute part of the employed in an economy. What we are
looking for is to count how many wage employees are covered by EPL, how many are
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Table 1 Legal coverage, or scope of the general EPL regime: excluded workers
None Afghanistan, Armenia, Georgia, Malaysia, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia
Domestic workers Argentinaa, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia,
Italy, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden,
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, USA, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia
Judiciary Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Czech Republic, Ethiopia, France, Hungary,
Italy, Switzerland, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia
Seafarers Bangladesh, Belgium, Cambodia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Japan, FYR of
Macedonia, Madagascar, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore,
Slovakia, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, UK
State security corps Ghana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia






UN employees Angola, Antigua, and Barbuda
Civil/public servants
(69 countries)
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Comoros, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Finland, France, Gabon, Central African Republic, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary,
Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Lesotho,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, USA, Venezuela, Viet Nam, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen
Police Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Hungary, Italy,
Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Slovenia, Switzerland, United Republic
of Tanzania, United Arab Emirates, UK, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia
Managerial/executive
positions
Angola, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, Estonia, Ethiopia, Germany, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria,
Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, USA, Viet Nam, Zambia
Sportsmen Italy, Saudi Arabia, Turkey
Employers’ family
members
Angola, Bangladesh, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Nigeria,
Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen




Teachers Bangladesh, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands
Flying personnel Cambodia, FYR of Macedonia, Nigeria, Turkey
Agricultural workers Argentinaa, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Greece, Honduras, Jordan, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia,
Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, USA, Yemen
Army Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia,
Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Russian Federation, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, United
Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, UK, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia
Members of
cooperatives
Angola, Greece, Panama, Sri Lanka, Viet Nam
Prison personnel Cameroon, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia
Apprentices Denmark, Lesotho, Morocco, Turkey,
Journalists Bangladesh, Italy, Morocco
Non-federally
regulated workers
Australia, Canada (Federal only)
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not, and relating the former number to the number of wage employees and of the
employed. Among employees, we include both permanent and temporary employees.
This inclusion is deliberate: on the one hand, both permanent and temporary em-
ployees are generally covered by EPL rules; on the other hand, different costs associated
with terminating permanent and temporary worker may impact the distribution of




aIn Argentina, agricultural workers are included into the EPL coverage since 2012 and domestic workers since 2013
bIn Denmark, white-collar workers are covered by specific collective agreements
Source: ILO (2015b)
Table 2 Legal coverage or scope of the general EPL regime: Excluded enterprises
Firm size Country
none Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil,
Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada (Federal only), Central African Republic, Chile, China,
Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Jordan, Lesotho,
Luxembourg, FYR of Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Republic of Moldova,
Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines,
Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, United







Morocco, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Switzerland – collective dismissal rules do not cover all enterprises (exceptions exist by enterprise size), but individual
dismissal rules apply to all enterprises
Portugal, Venezuela, Australia, and Italy – have different rules for enterprises of different size (as recorded in EPLex
indicators, which are computed separately for each broad category of enterprises); though all enterprises are covered by
EPL provisions
France – there is no general exclusion based on the size of the enterprise. However, the LC provides for exemptions from
some procedural requirement for enterprises employing less than 11 workers in particular with respect to sanctions in
the event of non compliance with dismissal (procedural and substantive)requirements. See art. L. 1235-5 LC and art. L.
1235-14 LC (on economic dismissal)
United States of America – there is no federal law regulating the termination of employment as such. The United States
has an “at will” employment system which allows for the dismissal of workers for any reason, or for no reason at all. With
the exceptions of the State of Montana, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the non-metropolitan territory of the US
Virgin Islands, there is currently no legislation specifically focused on employment termination. Some of the laws, as
reflected in EPLex indicators, are federal anti discrimination laws which operate to provide some measure of protection
to employees in regard to termination; they are supplemented in many of the fifty states by similar legislation
There are no exclusions in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, as amended through April 18, 1990, 29 U.S.C. secs.
151-169; in Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, as amended through January 2004, 29 U.S.C. secs. 651-678; or in
The Jury System Improvements Act of, Pub. L. 95-572, as amended by Public Law 110-406 of 13 October 2008, 28 U.S.C.
sec. 1861 et seq.. Note, however, the following:
• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: covers only employers having 15 or more employees (42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e(b) [sec. 701]).
• The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: covers only employers having 20 or more employees (29 U.S.C. sec. 630 (b) [sec. 11]).
• The Americans with Disabilities Act: covers only employers having 15 or more employees (42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(5)(A)
[sec. 101]).
• The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008: covers only employers having 15 or more employees ([sec. 201]),
referring to sec. 701b of the CRA (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b)). The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: covers only employers
having 50 or more employees ([sec. 101]
• The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act: covers only employers with 100 or more employees, not
counting employees who have worked less than 6 months in the last 12 months and not counting employees who
work an average of less than 20 hours a week (42 U.S.C. sec. 2101).
Moreover, some of these laws also include worker-related exclusions, such as for example worker tenure or accumulated
hours of work
Thus, in the US, different workers in enterprises of different size may be covered by different provisions
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workers across the permanent-temporary divide, and we certainly do not wish to
embed this endogeneity into coverage indicators.5 Note that, as per international statis-
tical definitions (Appendix 2), contributing family members and members of producer’s
cooperatives constitute employed individuals, but not employees; therefore, when such
categories of workers are explicitly mentioned in national EPL as excluded groups, we
ignore them for the computation of coverage.
As the ILO EPLex database contains data annually between 2009 and 2013, we
attempted to collect data for the same time period, annually. However, annual data
availability for many developing countries remains a challenge, and for this reason, in
the current paper, we report the results based on data only for the year 2010—the year
with the most comparable data—or the latest available year if neither data for 2010 nor
for the whole 2009–2013 range are available. As changes in legal coverage caused by
changes in legislation are rare, the statistical coverage exhibits low variation over time
and is in any case quite similar within countries across the years of the same decade.
The variations that we uncovered in the 2009–2013 period reflect mainly changes in
employment levels, the fact that entry to and exit from employment may differ between
specific excluded groups and an economy as a whole, as well as some changes in the
structure of employment, i.e., movement towards greater proportion of wage employ-
ment in developing countries. However, to the extent that one can accept the assump-
tion that flows in and out of aggregate employment are proportional to flows in and
out those occupations and sectors that are excluded from regulations, and that changes
in the structure of employment occur at a slow pace, such variations can be considered
as marginal.
3 Data description
The obtained data are the first of its kind and do offer some novel insights on the
potential role of employment protection. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the
two types of coverage—coverage of employees and coverage of employed. Table 3
also displays descriptive statistics. Jointly, they show that coverage of employees is
usually quite high in all considered countries, with the median of 99 %, though
some important outliers are present. Among such outliers are Bangladesh, United
Arab Emirates, and Turkey, which feature the lowest legal coverage of employees,
because by law, very sizeable groups of workers, such as agricultural and domestic
workers, are excluded from employment protection. In Turkey, also a sizeable
group of employees is excluded because firms with less than 30 workers are not
covered by the EPL provisions. In half of countries of our sample, however, legal
coverage of wage employees is complete (Figs. 1 and 2).
The differences in coverage of employees across countries primarily reflect the
differences in legal settings (i.e., how many groups of workers, and which specific
groups, will be excluded in one country but not in another), as well the sizes of
excluded groups that vary across countries. Thus, for example, domestic workers
are excluded from employment protection in both Denmark and Saudi Arabia;
however, in relative terms, there are over ten times more domestic workers in
Saudi Arabia than in Denmark, thus driving a wedge between coverage of em-
ployees in these two countries.
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Coverage of employed, by definition, is lower than coverage of employees. The differ-
ences between two types of coverage reflect mainly the structure of employment. While
in developed countries, the share of wage employment in total employment is high, it
can still be as low as 20 % in developing countries, as self-employment remains
sizeable. Given this, coverage of employed also exhibits a substantially higher variability
across countries (Figs. 1 and 3). Because, by definition, EPL applies only to workers in a
subordinate employment relationship, coverage of employed can never reach 100 %,
and in the majority of countries, it ranges from 40 to 70 %. The lowest coverage is re-
corded in Niger, with less than 5 % of employed being legally covered by EPL.
Consequently, differences across these two coverage variables primarily reflect devel-
opmental differences and regional disparities, to the extent that the latter are linked to
development (Figs. 4 and 5). As countries progress in their development, coverage of
employed increases and also approaches that of the employees.
Interestingly, coverage of employees can be equally high in developed and developing
countries, and we also find examples of both high and low coverage of employees at all
stages of development and in all regions. For example, among low-income countries,
the lowest coverage of employees is found in Rwanda (less than 70 %), but ten out of
17 countries in this income group feature a complete coverage of employees. Among
high-income countries, the lowest coverage of employees is in the United Arab Emir-
ates (around 50 %), Australia and Korea (slightly less than 70 %), while nine out of 24
countries in this income group feature a complete coverage of employees of 100 %.
This may suggest that not only levels of development but also specific legal or political
economy preferences may be at work in coverage design. In contrast, coverage of the
employed clearly increases with the level of development. It is also the highest in Euro-
pean countries, though some exceptions are also present, as coverage of employed is
quite low in Germany and Austria.
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of EPL Coverage, 2010
Variable N Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Coverage of employees 93 0,94 0,99 0,11 0,48 1,00
Coverage of employed 93 0,57 0,62 0,26 0,03 0,92
Source: own computations based on constructed coverage data
Fig. 1 Histograms of EPL coverage, 2010. Source: own computations based on constructed coverage data.
Note: density, on the vertical axis, reflects the number of countries falling into the same bandwidth of the
horizontal axis
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Figure 6 provides some further specific examples, for a subset of the world’s
major (G-20) economies. It shows a variation in coverage of employed in a range
from 38 to 90 %. It also shows that both types of coverage do not necessarily
move together. For example, while in Korea and Turkey both types of coverage
are relatively low, in Indonesia, coverage of employees is high, but the coverage
of employed is the lowest of the G-20 subsample.
Over the considered period of time, only two countries with legal reforms of
coverage were found: Argentina and Hungary. Argentina expanded considerably
its scope of EPL regulations, by including agricultural workers in 2012 and
domestic workers in 2013. EPL coverage of employed in this country thus passed
from about 50 % in 2011, to 53 % in 2012, to 58 % in 2013 (Fig. 7). In Hungary,
civil/public workers were excluded from the general EPL regime before 2012 and
governed by a separate act; the New Labour Code which came into force in 2012
does not include this provision. However, to the extent that civil/public workers
were and are covered by separate provisions, the new rule did not affect the
overall coverage computation.
Fig. 2 World map of EPL coverage of employees, 2010. Source: own computations based on constructed
coverage data
Fig. 3 World map of EPL coverage of employed, 2010. Source: own computations based on constructed
coverage data
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4 Coverage: some particularities
Obtained indicators of EPL coverage have several particularities, and it is important to
keep them in mind when using these coverage data. The first particularity is that, while
some workers are excluded from the general EPL regime, this does not necessarily
mean that they are unprotected. In fact, for some of them, special regimes may apply,
which may be less, or more, advantageous, as compared to the general regime. A
typical example would be public service, which in many countries would offer more
advantageous employment protection to workers as compared to workers in private
sector. The opposite situation is observed for domestic workers, who in the vast
Fig. 4 EPL coverage: regional disparities, density estimates. Source: own computations based on constructed
coverage data
Fig. 5 EPL coverage: income-level disparities, density estimates. Source: own computations based on constructed
coverage data
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majority of cases not only are unprotected by the general EPL regime but also do not
enjoy any protection whatsoever. In constructing statistical data on coverage, we as-
sumed that worker categories such as civil and public servants, judges, teachers, or po-
licemen enjoy an EPL regime at least as protective as the general EPL regime that
applies to other workers. For other worker categories, such as domestic workers, we gen-
erally accepted that they genuinely fall out of scope of the EPL protection. Appendix 1
contains the full list of possible excluded categories, as prescribed by national practice, as
well as the explanation of how they were treated for the purposes of collecting statistical
coverage information. It is important to bear in mind this unavoidable asymmetry of treat-
ment of some of the excluded groups across (and even within) countries.
Second, in this project, we focused on coverage of workers by general provisions con-
tained in national laws and, with some exceptions, national collective agreements.
Needless to say, case law, collective agreements at industry, sector, or plant level, may
contain provisions for those workers that have fallen out of scope of the national law
and may also be less, or more, generous, than the general EPL regime. Moreover, in
some countries, individual labor contracts may contain provisions that are more gener-
ous than those offered by national law. Therefore, we understand by obtained coverage
the coverage of the general EPL regime and not of the overall EPL regime. Indeed, to
have a complete picture of EPL in a country, it would be necessary to collect data not
Fig. 7 Evolution of coverage over time: the effect of legal changes. Source: own computations based on
constructed coverage data
Fig. 6 Some country-specific examples (countries of G-20 subsample). Source: own computations based on
constructed coverage data
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only on general EPL rules as stated in the labor laws but also on all special regimes and
special cases, and complement this information with the number of individuals in each
of the special-regime categories—an exercise beyond the scope of this paper.
Another particularity of coverage is that some firms or workers may be fully excluded
from all provisions of the general EPL regime, while others may be excluded only from
some provisions. For example, in the USA, over a dozen of national acts contain some
aspects of EPL provisions, but they apply to different workers or firms. For example,
the Family and Medical Leave Act, which contains provisions regarding parental leave
and discharge of employees for opposing any practice made unlawful by the Act, covers
only enterprises with 50 employees or more, as well as employees of such enterprises
provided they have worked for the employer for at least 12 months. In comparison, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, prohibiting the discharge on the grounds of
age, covers only employers having 20 or more employees. Thus, some employees would
enjoy the provisions of Age Discrimination in Employment Act, but not of the Family
and Medical Leave Act. Yet, some other acts may contain exclusions for firms of lower
size; in addition, in case of mass layoffs, higher firm-size thresholds may apply. Another
example is France, where there is no general exclusion based on the size of the enter-
prise, but the Labour Code provides for exemptions from some procedural require-
ments for enterprises employing less than 11 workers in particular with respect to
sanctions in the event of non-compliance with dismissal.
Relatedly, there is an important distinction between coverage and between different
provisions for different groups of workers. For example, in Austria, Belgium, or Greece,
different EPL rules exist for blue-collar and for white-collar workers. Similarly, in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Madagascar, workers are divided
into categories, and different EPL rules (such as notice periods or severance pay) apply
to workers in each category. Another example is Senegal and Tunisia, where workers
in managerial positions enjoy levels of protection different from those of other workers.
In all of these cases, each of the specific categories is considered as being covered by
EPL, despite the fact that different rules may apply.
There are two implications of these methodological issues. First, in constructing stat-
istical coverage data, to the extent possible, we accounted only for those workers that
are excluded from all legal EPL provisions. This means that our coverage data contain
workers with heterogeneous degree of protection. For example, in the USA, coverage
data would include workers that fall under some, though not all, acts and thus may be
protected in different ways. Second, in many countries, the obtained coverage data are
relatively high because they reflect the minimum possible level of afforded legal protec-
tion to the largest possible base of workers. In other words, it represents an upper
bound of the most basic EPL protection afforded to workers.
5 Legal coverage of protection and level of protection: are there trade-offs?
Coverage of employment protection is a specific aspect of this institution, determining,
together with the level of protection afforded by the institution and also together with
compliance, the degree to which this institution actually matters. Some observers, how-
ever, may be concerned that coverage and level of protection necessarily embed trade-
offs: high levels of protection cannot be afforded to all, while relatively low levels of
protection can be granted to a larger group of workers more easily (Boeri and Van
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Ours, 2008). In this section, we touch-base on this issue, by exploring, in a descriptive
manner, whether such arbitrage is actually observed.
In Table 4 (panel A), we correlate two types of coverage with the levels of protection
afforded to workers on permanent contracts, when those are terminated at the initiative
of the employer. This level is captured by a composite ILO EPLex indicator, which em-
beds information on trial periods, substantial requirements for dismissals (valid and
prohibited grounds), notification procedures and the duration of notice periods, and
severance and redundancy pay, as well as remedies available in case of contesting a dis-
missal. This indicator is constructed for the same sample of countries as our coverage
data (ILO, 2015c). As we can see, correlations between both types of coverage and
EPLex indicator are small but non-negligible, though, if anything, they are positive.
Figure 8 plots the EPL level against coverage of employed for the full sample of
countries, showing also graphically that the relationship is positive.
In Table 4 (panels A and B), we provide such correlations separately for lower-
income and higher-income countries. Interestingly, lower-income countries feature
higher degree of correlation between EPL level and EPL coverage than higher-income
countries, and this correlation is particularly high for the coverage of employed. One
explanation—which however would warrant a deeper investigation—would be that, for
these two subsets of countries, two opposing processes are at work.
To the extent that coverage of employed is closely associated with country’s level of
development, countries with higher level of protection afforded by EPL also seem to be
the ones with higher levels of development and coverage. In lower-income countries,
this result is consistent with the “structural transformation” models which imply that
the growth process produces higher protection afforded by labor law (Deakin, 2015).
Some of these countries have also adopted EPL institution relatively recently as
part of their development, and higher levels of protection serve important develop-
mental functions (Deakin, 2014). In higher-income countries,6 however, positive
correlation may be attenuated by the fact that some of these countries witnessed
Table 4 Correlation between EPL Level and coverage
A. All countries
EPLex Coverage of employees Coverage of employed
EPLex 1.00
Coverage of employees 0.19 1.00
Coverage of employed 0.10 0.24 1.00
B. Low-income and lower-middle-income countries
EPLex Coverage of employees Coverage of employed
EPLex 1.00
Coverage of employees 0.26 1.00
Coverage of employed 0.38 0.21 1.00
C. Higher-middle-income and higher-income countries
EPLex Coverage of employees Coverage of employed
EPLex 1.00
Coverage of employees 0.11 1.00
Coverage of employed 0.17 0.55 1.00
Source: own computations based on constructed coverage data and ILO EPLex (2015c)
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at least a century-long history of EPL, during which the EPL level has both gone
up and down (Adams and Deakin, 2014; Aleksynska and Schmidt, 2014), with sub-
stantially more deregulation in the past years promulgated by the Washington
Consensus (Deakin, 2015). The result observed for 2010 in these countries may
thus be an outcome of a longer process whereby higher shares of covered workers
were confronted with a recent decline in the protection levels.
As the coverage data that we collected concerns not only regulations of permanent
contracts but also of fixed-term contracts, we also correlate two types of coverage with
the ILO EPL dummy variable measuring whether fixed-term contracts are regulated or
not (in other words, whether the laws set any limits on the reasons for such contracts
use, their maximum duration, or the number of renewals). The correlation results are
very similar to the ones above (Table 5): positive correlations between coverage and
levels of protection are observed, with higher correlations for lower-income countries
and almost no correlation for higher-income ones.
Overall, these results indicate that rather than being a substitute for the degree of
protection, legal coverage represents yet another pillar of the employment protection
legislation that co-exists with the protection’s level. Because correlation between EPL
level and coverage can be non-negligible, our results suggest that failure to account for
EPL coverage in studies looking at aggregate effects of EPL level may lead to overesti-
mation of the role of EPL, and this overestimation may be especially important for
lower-income countries. Conversely, extending results of empirical findings on the role
of EPL based on developed-countries samples to developing countries should be done
with great caution.
6 From legal to effective coverage
One last point about collected data warranting a discussion concerns the fact that these
data represent legal, or de jure, but not effective, or de facto, coverage. To compute the
effective EPL coverage, several additional aspects need to be taken into account.
Fig. 8 EPL level and coverage: are there trade-offs? Source: own computations based on constructed cover-
age data and IlO EPLex (2015)
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First, employment protection legislation is a set of rules that govern (a) termin-
ation of regular contracts, in case of individual and collective dismissals, and (b)
hiring of employees on fixed-term contracts. The legal coverage data that we col-
lected concern both types of regulations, and hence both types of workers—regular
wage employees and wage employees holding fixed-term contracts. However, in
many developing countries, but also recently in developed countries as well, total
wage employment is not exhaustively measured as a sum of regular and fixed-term
employees, and other categories, such as casual workers, additionally exist. Accord-
ing to the 1993 Resolution concerning the International Classification of Status in
Employment,7 casual workers are defined as persons “who have an explicit or im-
plicit contract of employment which is not expected to continue for more than a
short period, whose duration is to be determined by national circumstance.” As
shown by De Stefano (2016), in the majority of countries, these workers are totally
or partially excluded from labor protection, either de jure, or de facto. One country
that particularly stands out in this regard is Australia. In this country, casual
workers are explicitly excluded by law from EPL provisions. We thus also excluded
them from computation of de jure coverage. In other countries, as shown by De
Stefano (2016), the law is less clear cut and may exclude casual workers from some
of the provisions or contain special provisions for them. Thus, we do not exclude
casual workers from computing de jure coverage in all other countries, though de
facto, they are likely to be excluded.
According to the ILO (2016, forthcoming), casual workers represent nearly a
quarter of wage employees in Indonesia and Bangladesh and about 14 % in
Uganda. If all of these workers are excluded from computation of coverage, effect-
ive, or de facto, coverage of employees would drop to about 70 % in Indonesia (in
contrast with computed 94.5 % legal coverage of employees), to about 24 % in
Bangladesh (in contrast with currently computed 48 % legal coverage of
Table 5 Correlation between regulation of FTC and coverage
A. All countries
EPLex Coverage of employees Coverage of employed
FTC are regulated 1.00
Coverage of employees 0.13 1.00
Coverage of employed 0.10 0.19 1.00
B. Low-income and lower-middle-income countries
EPLex Coverage of employees Coverage of employed
FTC are regulated 1.00
Coverage of employees 0.28 1.00
Coverage of employed 0.16 0.22 1.00
C. Higher-middle-income and higher-income countries
EPLex Coverage of employees Coverage of employed
FTC are regulated 1.00
Coverage of employees -0.01 1.00
Coverage of employed 0.04 0.56 1.00
Source: own computations based on constructed coverage data and IlO (2015b)
Aleksynska and Eberlein IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:17 Page 14 of 20
employees), and to about 86 % in Uganda (in contrast with currently computed
100 % legal coverage of employees).
Unfortunately, scaling up these computations to all countries is not possible, be-
cause data on casual workers is not available in all countries. Such data can also
be quite volatile, to the extent that casual employees represent a margin of adjust-
ment for employers (ibid). However, it is important to bear in mind that the size
of the casual work phenomenon can be important and that the role of EPL in
countries with sizeable casual work would be further overestimated. The effective
coverage of employees computed by excluding casual workers would also be con-
siderably more endogenous to the level of EPL, in contrast to the legal coverage,
because recourse to casual work may be propelled by motivations to avoid com-
plying with EPL. Similarly, new forms of employment, such as crowd-work
through internet platforms (when classified as wage employment), disguised self-
employment, ambiguous employment relationships, or other forms, may arise to
avoid EPL and lead to a decrease in effective EPL coverage.
Another issue to account for when computing effective coverage would be the
issue in compliance with labor regulations. In other words, an effectively covered
worker is a wage employee working for an employer complying with EPL. Statistics
on such employees can be collected though firm and worker surveys. Some very
rare examples of such surveys include the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS)
and the National Labour Force Survey (Sakernas), used by Brusentsev et al. (2012)
to assess receipt of severance pay among dismissed workers. Restricting the sample
to private and public sector employees covered by employment protection legisla-
tion and who experienced a job separation, these authors find that two thirds of
all eligible employees who separated from a job do not receive their severance pay-
ment. Moreover, workers obtain, on average, only 40 % of severance payments due
to them; in other words, most of the complying firms are complying only partially.
The authors also suggest that compliance and levels of severance pay set by law
exhibit sizeable trade-offs. It would be useful to include compliance questions in
labor force surveys in order to get a better understanding of EPL compliance, and
hence effective EPL coverage, in other countries.
Lastly, a related issue is the extent of informality of employment relationships, as
well as a proportion of written versus oral contracts in an economy. For example,
in countries such as Guatemala, Morocco, or Cameroun, over 60 % of workers do
not have written contracts (ILO, 2016), making it difficult for them to claim any
EPL entitlements even if the law in principle provides for them. Thus, the effective
EPL coverage would be even lower in these countries, depressing the aggregate role
of EPL even further.
At the same time, it would be wrong to compute effective coverage by exclud-
ing all informal workers from it. This is because legislation often provides a
“lighthouse” effect for workers in informal employment relationships, whereby
formal laws set a “social norm” and become a reference for bargaining even
among informal waged employees and their employers.8 This means that even
some informal workers may be covered, both in theory and in practice, by EPL.
This means that in countries with non-negligible informal sector, effective cover-
age would situate somewhere in between the legal coverage and the legal
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coverage that excludes informal workers. Moreover, while employment under oral
(often viewed as informal) arrangements is usually considered as offering less sta-
bility, in many countries (such as Ireland, Burkina Faso, or Zambia—for some
contracts), verbal employment agreements are also legally binding, with the same
force as written agreements, and hence, at least in principle, unlawful dismissals
may be contested in courts. And conversely, in certain countries, workers under
formal written contracts may de facto be deprived of EPL protection: for ex-
ample, in Russia, it is a common practice to require workers to deposit, at the
hiring stage, an application for a voluntary quit which does not contain a speci-
fied date, thus rendering Russian employment relations de facto employment at
will (Gimpelson et al., 2010). Similar practice has been anecdotally reported in
several Eastern European countries. Employers in formal employment relation-
ships may also bypass employment protection legislation by pressuring workers to
quit voluntarily and by harassing them (Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer, 2016), nego-
tiate disguised “consent” dismissals, or offer compensation payments below the
entitlement levels.
All in all, informality aspect of employment relationships, as well as the unavail-
ability of a written contract, has ambiguous relevance for EPL coverage: they
clearly diminish the extent of effective coverage as compared to legal coverage, but
the size of this reduction is country-specific and hard to evaluate on a consistent
basis. More generally, given the remarks outlined above, it would be fair to con-
clude that the legal coverage data that we collected represents the highest possible
upper bound of EPL coverage, which is substantially higher than the effective
coverage that may exist in any given country.
7 Conclusions
This study has documented the diversity of legal coverage of employment protec-
tion legislation across over 90 countries around 2010. Legal coverage defines those
categories of workers and firms that are concerned by the provisions. Coupled with
the level of protection afforded to workers and compliance with the EPL provi-
sions, legal coverage helps determine the extent to which regulations actually
matter.
By excluding some specific categories of workers or firms, EPL may create labor
market segments, the existence of which, in turn, may have diverse social cohesion
and distributional effects. Thus, the extent of coverage and definitions of various
exclusion conditions have implications for the way EPL reforms should be designed
and the effect of EPL and its reforms tested. As suggested by Boeri and Jimeno
(2005), “studies not acknowledging the role played by exemptions of small firms
may be looking for the “wrong” type of effects.” Similar reasoning can be applied
to the exemption of workers.
In this paper, we attempted to show that failure to account for EPL coverage in
studies looking at the aggregate role of EPL likely leads to an overestimation of
the role of EPL. Also, we argued that, because of the rise of new forms of em-
ployment, persisting informality, and lack of compliance with regulations in some
parts of the world, there are good reasons to believe that the effective, de facto,
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coverage still remains much lower than the legal coverage reported in this paper.
Much progress is still to be made to ensure that EPL is a relevant institution.
How can the data documented in this paper be used? Beyond simple
visualization of the diversity of EPL coverage, it is hoped that these coverage data
will be used to complement the existing EPL measures that reflect the level of pro-
tection/strictness of legislation, in studies assessing the potential macroeconomic
effects of EPL. It is also hoped that this study will open way to understanding how
various exclusions aimed at providing flexibility to some actors in the labor mar-
kets actually modify the behavior of these and other actors by modifying the incen-
tives to hire, retain, and fire workers. Such modified behavior may include but not
be limited to using alternative employment contracts, inventing new forms of em-
ployment, replacing employment contracts by civil contracts, or not recurring to
formal contracts altogether. This is an important area for future research.
Endnotes
1For an overview prior to 2010, see Skedinger, 2010. Studies performed on the micro-
level are able to account for the fact that EPL rules may not apply to all workers or that
different rules may apply to different workers. A prominent example is Boeri and
Jimeno, 2005.
2ILO, 2015b. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/eplex/termmain.home.
3They include the length of probationary period, substantive and procedural require-
ments for dismissal, and amount of redundancy and severance pay, as well as options
available in case of contesting dismissals.
4In fact, a true EPL coverage would take into account all possible EPL regimes
in a country and weight them by the proportion of workers concerned by such
regimes. For example, if sectoral or industrial collective agreements, contractual
agreements, or case law set special regimes for different worker categories, in
addition to the general EPL outlined in national legislation, it would be prefera-
ble to take them into account. To the extent that existing EPL indicators meas-
uring the level of protection, or costs of dismissals, afforded by EPL (for
example, ILO EPLex indicators, or OECD EPL indicators), also reflect mainly
laws and general regimes, our coverage data serves as a logical complement to
these data.
5The relatively standard line of reasoning suggests that the higher is the wedge
in the costs associated with terminating a temporary and a permanent worker, the
higher is the incidence of temporary employment (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994;
Blanchard and Landier, 2002; OECD, 2014).
6In this group of countries, the result is partly driven by the USA and the UK, which
feature the lowest EPL levels; however, lower correlations remain when we exclude
these two countries.
7Adopted by International Conference of Labour Statisticians. Available at: http://
www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/res/icse.pdf
8The lighthouse effect was first identified in Brazilian setting (Souza and Baltar,
1979), in reference to the use of the minimum wage in wage setting among
informally employed workers, but is considered as also applicable to other labor
protections.
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Included into computations of
coverage of employees and coverage
of employed
For computation purposes, considered as
having at least equal (though possibly superior)
employment protection
Domestic workers Yes No
Judiciary Yes Yes
Seafarers Yes No
State security corps Yes Yes
Diplomats Yes Yes





UN employees Yes Yes














Flying personnel Yes No











Dock workers Yes No
Casual workers Yes No
Blue-collar workers Yes No
Appendix 1
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Appendix 2
7.1 Statistical definitions
According to the Resolution concerning the International Classification of Status in
Employment (ICSE - 93), adopted by the ILO Interntaional Conference of Labour
Statisticians in 1993,
Employed comprise:
1. Employees, who get a basic remuneration directly dependent on the revenue of the
employer—among whom countries may need and be able to distinguish
“employees with stable contracts” (including “regular employees”)
2. Employers, who hold self-employment jobs (i.e., whose remuneration depends
directly on the (expectation of ) profits derived from the goods and services
produced) and engage one or more person to work for them as “employees,” on a
continuous basis
3. Own-account workers, who hold self-employment jobs and do not engage
“employees” on a continuous basis
4. Members of producers’ cooperatives, who hold self-employment jobs in a c-
operative producing goods and services, where the members take part on an
equal footing in making major decisions concerning the cooperative
5. Contributing family workers, who hold self-employment jobs in an establishment op-
erated by a related person, with a too limited degree of involvement in its operation
to be considered a partner
6. Workers not classifiable by status, for whom insufficient relevant information is
available and/or who cannot be included in any of the preceding categories
Categories 2–5 are considered also as self-employed.
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